Saturday’s >twin blasts in Kabul , in which at least 80 people died and over 260 were injured, is a clear escalation of the Afghan conflict by the Islamic State. Over the past two years, the IS has built some presence in eastern Afghanistan, operating largely from the chaotic Nangarhar province. But by carrying out one of the worst mass attacks in Kabul in 15 years, it has flaunted its growing footprint. It has sent a message that it is now a force to reckon with in Afghanistan. In turn, the attack once again exposes the chinks in the country’s security armour. Despite support from U.S. troops and its superior air cover, the Afghan military hasn’t been able to do much to prevent Taliban attacks in recent months. Now, with the IS also joining the fray, the security situation could become much worse. For the IS, Afghanistan is a potential area of expansion. It is under increasing pressure in Iraq and Syria in the wake of sustained attacks by, variously, the U.S., Kurdish groups and the Iraqi and Syrian national armies. Over the past year it has lost territory and thousands of fighters, forcing the leadership to look for other countries, especially Libya and Afghanistan. Groups such as the IS are most comfortable amidst chaos. The IS has exploited the post-war chaos in Iraq and the civil war uncertainty in Syria. Afghanistan falls into the same category. The civil war has substantially weakened post-Taliban state-building in Afghanistan, leaving several regions, particularly the mountainous areas along the Pakistan border, beyond the control of the government. Unsurprisingly, it is in one such district that the IS has found a foothold.
The Kabul attack also fits into the IS’s sectarian narrative. The targets of the blasts were the Hazaras, the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, which is mainly Shia. In both Iraq and Syria the IS has exploited the Shia-Sunni rivalry to win the support of Sunnis, particularly disaffected youth from the community. By directly attacking the Hazaras, the IS is clearly trying to whip up sectarian passions. This is a dangerous game that even the Taliban has largely stayed away from in Afghanistan. Though the Hazaras were persecuted under the Taliban in the 1990s, the Afghan civil war did not turn sectarian like the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The IS is trying to change this equation, because only then can it hope to spread its Sunni fundamentalist ideology to the Afghans. The question is how the Afghan government and the international coalition will respond to these twin challenges. If they indeed let the IS gain ground, as happened with the Taliban in the 1990s, the consequences will be far more disastrous.
